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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The district court entered its final judgment on October 7, 2014.
Record (R.) at 1384-1389. 1 The Steeds timely filed a notice of appeal on
November 6, 2014. R. at 1395-1397. This Court has jurisdiction under
Utah Code § 78A-4-103(2)(e).

Unless otherwise indicated all record citations are to the record from State v.
Joan A. Steed, No. 081907873.
1

lV

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
The Steeds owned a real estate development business. Around
10 years ago, the Utah State Tax Commission began auditing the
Steeds' sales tax collection. That audit expanded to include requests
for the Steeds' tax returns. When those requests repeatedly went
unanswered, the auditor referred the matter for a criminal
investigation. The Tax Commission led investigation resulted in
various criminal charges against the Steeds, including multiple counts
of failure to file tax returns and tax evasion, and a single count of
pattern of unlawful activity. See generally State v. Steed, 2014 UT 16,

,r,r 3-5, 325 P.3d 87. After trial, a jury convicted each of the Steeds of
three counts of failure to file a tax return and one count of a pattern of
unlawful activity. Id.

,r 13.

Though the Steeds disputed criminal liability, they repeatedly
admitted their failure to file tax returns. Id.

,r 12 ("The Steeds

conceded multiple times that they earned sufficient income each year
to trigger the filing requirement."). And after conviction, the Steeds
and the Tax Commission worked together to agree on the amount of
taxes (restitution) the Steeds owed, Aplt. Br. at 11; R. 1519 at 5, along
with the penalties and interests specified and authorized by statute for
1

the late filing and payment of taxes. R. 1306-07; Utah Code§§ 59-1401(2)(c), -401(3)(a), -402.
The district court sentenced Mr. and Mrs. Steed to suspended
prison terms, jail time, probation supervised by Adult Probation and
Parole, and imposed fines based on their convictions. R. 959-60; Frank
Steed R. 1334-35. Then as conditions of probation, the district court
ordered the Steeds to (among other things): obey the law, timely file all
tax returns, serve their jail time, pay their criminal fines, pay the
agreed upon restitution amounts, plus pay 20% of the restitution
amounts as a penalty, and interest as set forth by statute. R. 961,
1519 at 5-9; Frank Steed R. 1335.
In compliance with their probation terms, the Steeds paid (1) the
criminal fines to the Department of Corrections, (2) the restitution,
penalties and interest to the Utah State Tax Commission, (3) the
probation supervision costs to the Division of Adult Probation and
Parole, and (4) paid money to Wasatch County for the ability to serve
·..tJ

jail time at the County's jail instead of at the Salt Lake County Jail.
Aplt. Br. at 3-4; R. 1384-85; R. 1519 at 11 (explaining fines to be paid
to the Department of Corrections).

2

The Steeds appealed, challenging only their convictions. Steed,
2014 UT 16,

,r 16.

Notably, the Steeds did not challenge the amounts,

grounds or authority justifying their payment of taxes/restitution,
penalties, interest, or probation supervision.
The Supreme Court heard the appeal and reversed "because
there was insufficient evidence to support the failure-to-file charges as
ultimately presented in the jury instructions." Steed, 2014 UT 16,

,r

55. Although the Court concluded "that the State did present
sufficient evidence of the Steeds' 'intent to evade ... [a] requirement of
Title 59," that alternative for conviction was not submitted to the jury
and there "was insufficient evidence to support the two intent
alternatives that were ultimately submitted." Id.

,r 37.

The Court

therefore reversed and remanded "with instructions to enter a
judgment of acquittal." Id.

,r 55.

On remand, the Steeds wanted more than just entry of a
judgment of acquittal. They also asked the district court to order a
refund of "all fines, penalties and interest assessed against them ...
and all costs associated with their incarceration and probation." R.
1202. The district court granted the Steeds a refund of the criminal
fines. R. 1386. But the Court denied the motion as to the tax
3

penalties, interest, and all costs relating to probation supervision and
time spent at the Wasatch County Jail. R. 1385-88. The district court
reasoned that there were justifications for the Steeds to pay all of
those funds independent of their convictions. Id.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The district court's decision should be affirmed for any one of
multiple reasons. First, the Steeds cannot argue that payment of the
disputed funds violates due process because they did not raise the
issue in their first appeal. They have waived the argument and the
district court's original order requiring the payments is now
mandatory.
Second, the Steeds' refund request exceeds the scope of the
Supreme Court's mandate, which expressly ordered the district court
only to "enter a judgment of acquittal."
Third, none of the entities from which the Steeds want their
refund are even parties to this matter. Only the State and the Steeds
are parties to this criminal proceeding. The court cannot order
refunds from other non-party governmental entities.
Fourth, the Steeds' due process arguments do not require a
refund of the tax penalties, interest and probation supervision fees.
4
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The Steeds paid these amounts as conditions of their probation. And it
is undisputed that the Steeds owed these amounts independent of the
convictions. The Steeds repeatedly admitted that they did not file
their tax returns. And the tax penalties and interest the district court
ordered the Steeds to pay are clearly authorized as civil penalties by
Title 59. Likewise, the probation supervision fees are based on the fact
that Adult Probation and Parole provided tangible services to the
Steeds and the Steeds avoided further incarceration by choosing
probation, and the attendant supervision, over prison.

ARGUMENT
To state the Steeds' argument is to refute it. According to them,
due process requires the district court to (1) ignore the Steeds' waiver
of their issue by failing to raise it in their prior appeal, (2) exceed the
Supreme Court's specific mandate, (3) order governmental entities
that are not parties to this proceeding to give money to the Steeds, (4)
ignore the fact that the Steeds admit they didn't file necessary tax
returns, and (5) ignore the fact that the Steeds actually owe the
disputed funds for reasons other than their conviction. As explained
below, the Steeds' argument should be rejected and the district court's
decision affirmed.
5

I.

The Steeds are barred from asserting an alleged right to
a return of the funds at issue.
The Court need not reach the merits of the appeal to affirm the

district court's decision. The mandate rule bars the Steeds' arguments
for either one of two related reasons: the Steeds waived the issue by
not raising it in their appeal and their arguments request relief that
goes well beyond the Supreme Court's mandate. 2
A.

The Steeds waived any challenge to the penalties
and interest by not raising the issue in their initial
appeal

As a condition of probation, the district court ordered the Steeds
to pay restitution (the back taxes the Steeds and the Tax Commission
agreed that they owed), "interest at the statutory rate," and a 20%
penalty composed of 10% for late filing and 10% for late payment. R.
1306-07; R. 1519 at 5-11. Though the district court did not specify in
writing that the penalties and interest were derived from the civil
penalties outlined in Utah Code§ 59-1-401 & -402 for failure to file a
The State briefly raised these issues before the trial court, R. 1286, though
not to the extent done in this brief. The may nevertheless consider the
issues. It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm on any ground
apparent from the record, regardless of whether it was argued in the trial
court or even on appeal. First Equity Federal, Inc., v. Phillips Dev., LC, 2002
UT 56,, 11, 52 P.3d 1137.
2
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tax return and non-payment of taxes, that fact was readily apparent to
all involved. See, e.g., R. 1306-07 (tax commission report outlining the
amount of taxes, amount and nature of the penalties, and interest the
Steeds owed). Indeed, the State is not aware of any other basis upon
which the district court could have imposed the penalties and interest
(especially after it imposed independent criminal fines as an express
part of the Steeds' actual sentences).
But now the Steeds argue that the district court could not
impose those penalties and fines pursuant to§ 59-1-401 because "the
trial court is not the Tax Commission" and "including penalties and
interest in the restitution order" somehow "deprive[d] the Steeds" of an
opportunity to "challenge those levies." Aplt. Br. at 12-13.
Of course, the argument overlooks the fact that the Steeds had a
full and fair opportunity to challenge the civil tax penalties and
interest in the district court and could, and should, have raised any
challenges in their direct appeal. Instead, the Steeds challenged just
their convictions on three grounds: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence,
(2) the constitutionality of Utah's expert notice statute, and (3) the
trial court's failure to strike the testimony of the State's expert
witness. Steed, 2014 UT 16,

il 16.
7

Accordingly, the Steeds waived any challenge to the tax
penalties and fees. They don't get a second bite at the apple on remand
and a subsequent appeal. Unless required otherwise by the appellate
court's ruling, the mandate rule "dictates that a prior decision of a
district court becomes mandatory after an appeal and remand." IHC

Health Servs., Inc. v. D&K Management, Inc., 2008 UT 73, ,I 28, 196
P.3d 588. As explained below, the Supreme Court's mandate does not
require or permit the Steeds' requested refund.

B.

The Steeds' request for a refund exceeds the scope
of the Supreme Court's mandate

The Steeds' failure to raise, and subsequent waiver of, their
current arguments in their prior appeal leads to a second problem: the
request for a refund exceeds the scope of the Supreme Court's
mandate. Given the issues the Steeds actually raised on appeal, the
Supreme Court very specifically and narrowly instructed the district
court "to enter a judgment of acquittal" on remand. Steed, 2014 UT
16, ,I 56; see also id. ,I 2 ("We therefore reverse each of the Steeds'
failure-to-file convictions and remand with instructions to enter a
judgment of acquittal."). The district court had "no discretion whether

8

to comply with the mandate." Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Ivers, 2009 UT
56, ,I 8, 218 P.3d 583.
The mandate rule "'dictates that pronouncements of an appellate
court on legal issues in a case become the law of the case and must be
followed in subsequent proceedings of that case."' Id. ,I 12 (quoting

Thurston v. Box Elder Cnty., 892 P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (Utah 1995)).
Both the district court and the parties must honor the appellate court's
mandate. Ivers, 2009 UT 56, ,I 12. As a result, when a judgment is
affirmed or reversed and remanded with instructions "'to enter a
particular judgment, the trial court may not permit amended or
supplemental pleadings to be framed to try rights already settled."' Id.
(quoting Street v. Fourth Jud. Dist. Court, 113 Utah 60, 191 P.2d 153,
158 (1948)).
Consequently, the mandate rule bars the Steeds' attempt to
litigate a refund on remand. That is especially true because the
Steeds failed to raise the issue (or make it apparent in the record from
the first appeal) and repeatedly conceded that they had failed to file
tax returns, which the Supreme Court expressly noted along with the
fact that such a failure triggered "civil penalties" under Utah Code§
59-1-401. Steed, 2014 UT 16, ,I,I 12, 22 & n.18. Under these
9

circumstances, Ivers makes clear that the mandate rule bars the
Steeds' arguments on remand. Ivers, 2009 UT 56, , 20 (noting that
"UDOT's failure to make apparent in the record before Ivers I the
theory that Arby's had no right of view, its stipulation prior to final
judgment that no triable issues remained, and the necessary
implication of Arby's right of view in our ruling in Ivers I prohibit
UDOT from reframing the issue to its advantage after remand").
This Court's decision in J. Pochynok Co., Inc. v. Smedsrud, also
demonstrates that the Steeds' arguments are barred by the mandate
rule. 2007 UT App 88, , , 15-16, 157 P.3d 822. There, the district
court ruled that the Smedsruds were the prevailing party in a lien
foreclosure action and therefore entitled to attorney's fees and costs.

Id. , 4. The Smedsruds then garnished the fees and costs from
Pochynok. Id. But the Supreme Court ultimately reversed the district
court's decision and remanded "for a factual determination of awards
and offsets [consistent with the findings likely considered and made by
the jury], followed by a ruling on who is the successful party ... and
whether an award of attorneys fees . . . is proper." Id.

1 5.

Back on remand, Pochynok moved to set aside the garnishment.

Id.

,r 6.

This Court held, however, that the issue was not before the
10

trial court on remand. Id.

1 15.

Notably, the Court reasoned that the

Supreme Court remanded the case "for one purpose-to have the trial
court enter findings and conclusion assessing the awards and offsets
likely considered and made by the jury." Id.

1 16 (internal quotation

marks omitted). And that remand "did not instruct the trial court to
order the costs and attorney fees returned." Id. Because the
Pochynok's garnishment-refund argument went beyond the scope of
the mandate, this Court did not address the issue.
The same conclusion applies here. The Supreme Court
remanded for only one purpose (consistent with the Steeds' arguments
in that Court)-"to enter a judgment of acquittal"-not to litigate
returning funds that the Steeds legitimately owed independent of their
conviction.
II.

The district court lacks authority to compel non-parties
to refund money to the Steeds
Ironically, the Steeds' conception of their own due process rights

would require the district court to violate the due process rights of
non-parties. The Steeds acknowledge that they paid the funds they
now want refunded to the Utah State Tax Commission, Wasatch
County (or its jail), and Adult Probation and Parole, a Division of the

11

Utah Department of Corrections. Aplt. Br. at 3-4. Yet none of these
distinct governmental entities are parties to this this appeal or the
remand proceedings in district court; nor could they be. This matter
arises from a criminal case, which only involves the incorporeal State
of Utah and the Steeds. State v. Lane, 2009 UT 35,

,r 17, 212 P.3d 529

("Only the State and the defendant are actual parties to a criminal

. ") .
act 10n.
As the Steeds acknowledge, due process at a minimum requires
that no one can be deprived of property without adequate notice and a
meaningful opportunity to be heard. Aplt. Br. at 5; see also Salt Lake

City Corp. v. Jordan River Restoration Network, 2012 UT 84,

,r 50, 299

P.3d 990. More fundamentally, the district court lacks jurisdiction to
compel non-parties to pay money to the Steeds.
Moreover, if the Steeds want a refund from the Tax Commission,
Utah law outlines the proper procedures and mechanisms they must
follow. Utah Code§ 59-1-1410(8)(a) (the Tax Commission may not pay
a refund unless the person files a claim with the Commission within a
certain amount of time).

12

III.

The district court's decision does not violate the Steeds'
due process rights
In addition to the waiver, mandate and jurisdictional problems

with the Steeds' due process arguments, their position fails on the
merit. 3

A.

Due process does not require a refund of the tax
penalties and fees

The district court correctly denied the Steeds' request to order a
refund of the tax penalties and interest they paid to the Tax
Commission. The district court based its decision on several facts: (1)
the Steeds' admission that their income triggered tax filing
retirements, (2) the Steeds' failure to timely file tax returns for the
2003-2008 tax years, (3) the Tax Commission's statutory authority to
charge penalties and interest, (4) the penalties and interest imposed
do not hinge on a criminal conviction, and (5) the Steeds collaborated
with the Tax Commission to agree on the taxes due along with the
penalties and interest (which are set by statute). R. 1386.

Of course, the State does not represent in this action any of the non-parties
from whom the Steeds seek refunds. If given the chance to be heard, the
non-parties may have additional arguments in support of affirming the
district court's decision.
3
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The Steeds don't really contest those facts, nor the accuracy of
the amounts they were ordered to pay in taxes, penalties, and interest.
Rather, the Steeds concoct a theory that the district court lost some
sort of gamble by imposing§ 59-1-401 penalties and interest as an
inextricable part of the "restitution order" so the Steeds would
somehow be deprived of any opportunity to "challenge those levies."
Aplt. Br. at 12-13. When the Steeds were acquitted on appeal, they
argue, the district court's scheme crumbled along with any
justification for ordering payment of restitution, penalties and
interest. Id.
There are several flaws with that version of events. First, it's
problematic for the Steeds to argue their acquittal negated any
justification for paying restitution/taxes while at the same time
emphasizing that they aren't asking for a refund of their tax
restitution payments. Aplt. Br. at 9-10. The disconnect between their
appellate argument and actions concede, at least implicitly, that they
have an independent legal obligation to pay taxes regardless of any
criminal convictions or acquittals. See, e.g., Utah Code 59-10-104(1).
Moreover, the district court noted at the sentencing hearing that the
Steeds' counsel "agrees that I can order that [the Steeds] pay [taxes
14

owed] as a condition of probation" but counsel just did not want any
such payments called restitution as to tax years unrelated to the
Steeds' conviction. R. 1519 at 13.
Likewise, there is also an independent reason for the Steeds to
pay the tax penalties and interest. The obligation to pay them does
not depend on a criminal conviction, nor does it depend on a
restitution order. See, e.g., Utah Code§ 59-1-401(2) to 401(3); id. § 402; see also Steed, 2014 UT 16,

1 22 (citing§ 59-1-401 while noting

that "[a] defendant's failure to file without a corresponding intent
gives rise only to civil penalties, which are much less severe" than
criminal penalties). The civil penalty is based simply on a percentage
of the unpaid tax. Id. §§ -401(2)(c), -401(3)(b). The fact here that the
Steeds and the Tax Commission agreed on the amount of the unpaid
taxes simply made the restitution/tax amount an easy reference point
for the penalties and interest. Nothing ties the viability of the
penalties and interest payments to a "restitution order."
Moreover, it is unclear what the Steeds mean by "restitution
order." In reality, the district court ordered, as conditions of probation,
that the Steeds obey the law, timely file all tax returns, pay restitution
for certain years, and pay a 20% penalty and interest at the statutory

15

rate. R. 961; Frank Steed R. 1336. The Steeds had independent
obligations to do all of these things anyway. See, e.g., Steed, 2014 UT
16,

1 30 ("Title 59 also requires residents to file income tax returns

whenever [certain] income thresholds are met, which the Steeds
concede were met in this case."). All the acquittal did, in pertinent
part, was ensure that if the Steeds violated any of these conditions,
they wouldn't go to prison as a result of the now overturned
convictions and criminal sentences. The acquittal no more excused the
Steeds from paying their tax penalties and interest than it excused
them from obeying the law or timely filing and paying their taxes
going forward.
The next problem with Steeds' due process theory is that, as
noted above, the Steeds were never deprived of any opportunity to
challenge the restitution amounts, the penalties or the interest.
Indeed, they have not pointed to one obstacle that conceivably
hindered them from objecting to the grounds for, or the amounts of,
the taxes, penalties or interest. Moreover, it's difficult to imagine
what they could have challenged. They admit to collaborating with the
Tax Commission to arrive at the correct amounts, and the penalties

16

and interest are set by statute. There really wasn't anything for the
Steeds to complain about.
In sum, the Steeds do not present a credible due process
challenge to the district court's refusal to order a refund of the
penalties and interest. The decision should be affirmed.

B.

Due process does not require the refund of the
probation supervision fees

The district court properly refused to order the refund of monies
the Steeds paid to Adult Probation and Parole as compensation for the
supervision of their probation. 4 The district court's decision finds
support in State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), and

State v. Walker, 887 P.2d 53, 56 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994).
In Parker, two panel members agreed-albeit for different
reasons-that due process did not require anyone to refund the fees
the defendant paid for services he received at a rehabilitation facility
prior to the reversal of his conviction. Parker, 872 P.2d at 1048, 1050
(Davis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 1051
(Greenwood, J., concurring in result only with Davis, Judge). Judge

Wasatch County has indicated its intent to file a brief in this matter. The
State therefore will not address the Steeds request for a refund of fees they
paid to the County.

4
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Davis held that due process required only notice and an opportunity to
be heard, which Parker had been afforded. Id. at 1050. Judge
Greenwood held that the fairness considerations undergirding due
process did not require reimbursement where Parker "received
something in exchange for his payment" and "avoided incarceration in
prison." Id. at 1050-51.
Consistent with Parker, the Idaho Court of Appeals
subsequently held that a "defendant was not entitled to a refund of the
costs of probation supervision, even though his conviction was set
aside and the criminal charge was dismissed, when the State in fact
provided the supervision service." 887 P.2d at 57.
All of those considerations from Parker and Walker apply here.
Adult Probation and Parole did provide actual supervision services to
the Steeds and they did avoid further incarceration. Due process does
not demand the refund of the probation-supervision fees.
In response, the Steeds merely urge the Court to adopt Judge
Billings' expansive view of due process and the 'incidents of conviction.'
Aplt. Br. at 18. But Judge Davis aptly highlighted the reasons not to
start down that slippery slope:

18

Perhaps the greatest difficulty I have with expanding the
"incidents of conviction" for which the State must make the
defendant whole is its potential application to almost any
event that may occur as a result of a criminal conviction.
For example, would the State be required to reimburse
defendants for fees paid to private rehabilitative facilities
including vocational schools and hospitals? Would the State
be required to, in effect, be the insurer for such facilities?
Would the State be required to reimburse the defendant
for restitution paid to a victim? Would the State become an
insurer for those funds as well? Perhaps most importantly,
the prospect of having to make a convicted criminal whole,
however remote , may have a chilling effect upon the
availability and use of rehabilitative services.
Parker, 872 P.2d at 1049-50. Those concerns still resonate in this case.

The district court's decision on this issue should be affirmed.

CON CLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the decision
of the district court.
SEAN D. REYES

Assistant Utah Attorney General
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Chief Civil Deputy
Office of the Utah Attorney
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856
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